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Abstract
The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by 
dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has 
gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of 
function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of 
self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where 
organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These 
cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not 
contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of the organism 
carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that 
belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the 
problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational 
account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it 
does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological 
theories of function.
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1 Introduction
Our everyday  talk  and the  regimented  discourse  of  sciences  such  as, 
most  notably,  biology,  is  shot  through  with  teleology.  We  describe 
artifacts and natural devices as being supposed to do such and such, or 
having  the  function  of  behaving  in  thus  and  so  a  manner.  This  is  in 
apparent tension with the idea that there are no final causes – not if they 
are  supposed  to  be  essentially  different  from,  and  not  supervene  on, 
efficient causes. Philosophers have proposed several accounts of function 
which try  to reconcile  the former appeals to teleology with the latter 
scruples about causation. 
Theoretical  efforts  in  this  direction  have  traditionally  taken  two 
alternative approaches. One the one hand,  etiological theories1 propose 
to unpack the teleology in functional talk in terms of explanations of the 
existence  of  the  functional  device.  So,  for  example,  a  prototype 
corkscrew is supposed to uncork bottles because it has been designed to 
uncork bottles: the relevant intentional states of the industrial designer 
in the process of constructing the prototype are, it  is to be supposed, 
1 The foundational insight is mainly associated with Wright (1973), but was also 
suggested independently by other authors in the 70s, such as Ayala  (1970).
directed to that particular goal,  and they explain the existence of the 
prototype. In the more important case in which there are no designers 
with intentional states – for example, when dealing with natural devices 
such as wings or beaks – the most popular elaboration of the etiological 
insight2 appeals  to  the  causal  contribution  that  past  instances  of  the 
device in question have had in the existence of present instances of the 
device. So, the wings of a certain bird B are  supposed  to help it fly in 
virtue of the following fact:
The Etiology of  Wings:  The actual  existence  of  B’s  wings  is  
explained  by  wings  having  helped  B’s  ancestors  to  fly  in  the  
(comparatively recent) past.
In general, the main tenet of the etiological account of function,  as we 
will be understanding it throughout the paper, is the following:
Etiological Function: A trait T has the function of producing an 
effect of type E in an organism O if and only the following fact  
contributes, in the relevant way, to a causal explanation that T is in 
O:  T  has  contributed  to  the  fitness  of  O’s  ancestors  (in  the  
comparatively recent past) by producing effects of type E.
While  this  is  plausibly  regarded  as  the  common  core  to  the  most 
prominent among extant etiological accounts of the function of natural 
devices, particular theories will fill in details in different ways3. 
On the other hand,  dispositional4 theories  (defended, among others, by 
Cummins  (1975)  and  Bigelow  and  Pargetter  (1987))  suggest  that 
function attributions are grounded on the causal role of the putatively 
functional device in a certain system. Simplifying, in Cummins’s systemic 
approach the function of a wing is to be identified with its contribution to 
the bird’s ability to fly. For other authors, the functional device is to make 
a contribution to the survival of the creature who possesses it (Bigelow 
and  Pargetter,  1987),  or  to  certain  goal-states  of  those  creatures 
(Boorse,  1976). 
2 See, among many others, Godfrey-Smith  (1994), Millikan  (1984, chapter 2), 
Millikan  (2002), Price  (1998).
3 One can see many of the differences among these accounts as stemming from the 
different possible unpackings of “... in the relevant way” in the definition. In 
particular, Etiological Function is compatible with, but not committed to, a selected-
effects theory of function.
4 We follow Mossio et al. (2009) and Saborido et al. (2011) in using the dispositional 
label for this other tradition. Other authors have talked of systemic approaches to 
refer to closely related accounts. We also follow Mossio and colleagues (and others 
such as Allen 2009 or Davies 2001)  in adopting this coarse-grained perspective on 
the function debate, as taking place between two main opposing camps – 
dispositional and etiological. Our discussion does not interact in any substantial way  
with this choice; thus, we believe, the dialectically most prudent option is to respect 
the terms in which the proponents of the view we are criticizing have chosen to 
frame it.
Neither  of  these  approaches  has  passed unchallenged.  Mossio  et  al.  
(2009, p. 822) summarize two main complaints against them: 
Dispositional  theories  try  to  account  for  functions  in  terms  of 
current  contributions  to  some  target  capacity  of  a  system,  and 
discard the teleological dimension, but seem unable to provide fully 
adequate normative criteria on functional attributions. Etiological 
theories, on the other hand, try to account for both the teleological 
and normative dimensions of functions, but are unable to justify 
how functional attributions may refer to features and properties of 
the current system being analyzed. (Ibid.)
That is, dispositional approaches, by focusing on the contribution of an 
actual device to an actual system, are seemingly unable to recover the 
normativity implicit in the notion of function. The point, very familiar in 
the  literature  on  functions,  would  be  that  dispositional  approaches 
conflate having a function with functioning as: A tree stump can function 
as  a table,  but it  does not  have the function  of doing so.5 This is the 
normativity problem. 
On the other hand, etiological theories, by focusing on the performance 
of past instances of the putatively functional device, make the having of a 
function independent of the causal powers of the actual functional device 
– the upshot, implausible for some, being that the function of the device 
is only indirectly related to what the device actually does. This is the 
epiphenomenality problem  (cf. Christensen  and  Bickhard  2002).  For 
instance, the function of Obama’s heart is not determined by anything 
that it actually does or can do; his heart has the function of pumping 
blood in virtue of belonging to the kind heart, which has been selected 
for pumping blood. As a consequence, the capacities of Obama’s heart 
are irrelevant for ascribing it a function.6 
Recently  a  third  contender,  the  organizational  account  has  gained 
prominence in the debate, with a promise to solve both the normativity 
and epiphenomenality problems. In this paper we discuss and criticize 
the  version  of  the  organizational  account  put  forward  by  Mossio, 
Saborido and Moreno in their (2009) and (2011). We argue that if this 
version (OA, henceforth) is to solve the problem of normativity in cross-
generational traits raised by Delancey  (2006) in the manner defended in 
5 For more on this distinction see, e.g, Millikan (1989), Neander (1991), Davies (2001, 
p. 76), Wilson and Craver (2006, p. 97).
6 As we read it, this objection differs from Paul Davies' (2001, ch. 5), who argues that 
the etiological theory of functions is committed to the existence of non-causal 
abstract entities and that this assumption is in tension with naturalism. In contrast, 
the epiphenomenality problem points out that on the this approach the function of an 
entity does not depend on what that entity does or can do. Thus, according to the 
etiological theory, a token trait has a function in virtue of something that is not 
directly related to that particular token. Whether this other entity that grounds the 
function attribution is abstract or not, and whether it is compatible with a 
metaphysical interpretation of naturalism is a different question altogether. We would 
like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this connection.
Saborido et  al.  (2011), then OA is an etiological theory of function, in 
the sense made explicit in the definition above.7
We  will,  first,  quickly  introduce  OA  (section  2)  and  the  challenge 
presented by cross-generational traits (Section 3). After that, in Section 4 
we  will  show that  the  kind  of  solution  advocated  in  Saborido  et  al.  
(2011) effectively turns OA into an etiological  theory. In Section 5 we 
chart some of the similarities of OA with other etiological accounts – in 
particular, in subsection 5.1, that it falls prey to the epiphenomenality 
problem8 –, and some of its differences – in particular, in subsection 5.3, 
that  it  seems to be committed to a very awkward locus of  functional 
attribution for cross-generational traits. We finish the section by showing 
that, in fact, the conclusion that OA is an etiological account generalizes 
beyond the cross-generational case. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
2 The Organizational Account of Biological Function
Mossio,  Saborido  and  Moreno suggest  that  the  only  systems  with 
function are those which present what they call  organizational closure, 
that is: 
[T]he  interplay  between  a  set  of  mutually  dependent  structures 
acting as constraints, each of which makes a specific and distinct 
contribution,  [realizing]  self-maintenance  by  maintaining  the 
boundary conditions at which the whole organization, as well as its 
various structures, can exist. (Saborido et al., 2011, p. 593)
Two  main  ideas  are  deployed  here:  first,  the  locus  of  functional 
attributions  is  self-maintaining  systems:  those  that,  in  Saborido  and 
colleagues' turn of phrase, “make a difference for [themselves]” (ibid.) in 
that they are a precondition of their own existence. Second, this process 
of  self-maintenance  must  work  through  the  interaction  of  parts  of  a 
complex whole,  which both enables  and constrains  the  activity  of  the 
parts: on the one hand functional parts of a system cannot do any old 
thing if they are to contribute to the maintenance of the system; and, on 
the other hand, these same parts would be unable of doing anything, if it 
wasn't for the support provided by the other parts.
7 Mossio and colleagues are happy to acknowledge the etiological dimension of OA 
(see, e.g., Mossio et al. 2009, p. 836). Nevertheless, this etiological dimension is 
limited to the fact that the performance of a functional trait in an individual help 
explain the maintenance of the trait in the very same individual – by helping to 
prevent the individual from disappearing, for example. We, on the other hand, are 
using “etiological function” in its most prominent, distinctly historical sense, as made 
clear by the definition in page 2 of this paper. The claim is that OA is an etiological 
account in this sense.
8 We should probably point out that we are do not regard the epiphenomenality 
problem as particularly pressing --- we are, that is, happy to accept that a device can 
fail to perform the function it has; this is plausibly the case with flawed corkscrew 
prototypes, or congenitally defective kidneys, for example.
Our point, here and throughout the paper is, merely, that OA is no better off than 
other prominent etiological accounts in this or any other respects.
According to these authors, the most common examples of systems in 
organizational closure are biological systems, also the natural  locus  for 
the attribution of function.  Saborido and colleagues suggest that a trait 
type  is  functional  iff it  is  part  of  a  self-maintaining  system  in  
organizational closure:
Organizational Function: A trait type T has a function if, and  
only if, it is subject to organizational closure C in a differentiated 
self-maintaining system S. 
This  definition  implies  the  fulfillment  of  three  different  conditions. 
Accordingly, a trait T has a function if and only if: 
C1) T contributes to the maintenance of the organization O of S; 
C2) T is produced and maintained under some constraints exerted 
by O; 
C3) S realizes organizational closure. (Mossio et  al.,  2011, p. 594)
Certainly,  it  seems  that  OA  warrants  functional  attributions  to  many 
biological traits in a way that fits our intuitions. For instance, OA can 
explain that the kidney is a functional organ: kidneys contribute to the 
overall self-maintenance of the human organism by filtering waste from 
blood, they are maintained by the very same organism they contribute to, 
and  finally,  the  human  organism  exhibits  the  kind  of  organizational 
closure that is required for satisfying clause C3. The fact that OA seems 
to correctly identify functional devices in many central cases lends strong 
support for it and encourages a more careful consideration of its merits 
and demerits9. 
3 The cross-generational problem
Unfortunately,  there  is  a  set  of  cases  where  OA  seems  to  generate 
counterintuitive  results.  These  cases  involve  cross-generational  traits, 
that  is,  traits  that  do not  contribute  in  any  relevant  way to  the  self-
maintenance  of  the  organism  carrying  them,  but  instead  have  very 
important  effects  on organisms that  belong to  the  next  generation.  A 
prominent  example  of  a  cross-generational  trait  is  sperm.  Indeed, 
arguably,  the  sperm  of  a  organism  O  does  not  contribute  to  the 
maintenance of O – although it is, of course, crucial for the very existence 
of the following generation –, and this in its turn means that condition C1 
in Organizational Function is not satisfied. As a consequence, OA has the 
very counterintuitive consequence that sperm does not have any function 
9  A minor problem with the definition given in Organizational Function is that it 
doesn’t comment on which is the function of, e.g., kidneys – it only entails that they 
have one (pace their suggestion that it warrants the claim that the heart has the 
function of pumping blood.) We will assume that modifying Saborido and colleagues’s 
definition so as to ground the relevant type of which claims would not prove too 
difficult. For more details, see Author 1 (2011).
– see Delancey (2006).
Notice  that  this  problem can  be  extended,  beyond  the  kind  of  traits 
considered  in  Delancey  (2006),  those  most  obviously  linked  to 
reproduction, to others that also have their main positive effect in later 
generations. Take, for example, action-inhibiting calls in greylag goose 
parents, which aim at preventing premature attempts to fly from their 
youngsters  (Avital  and  Yablonka,  2000,  p.  117).  Such  behavior  is, 
arguably, of no use to the adult bird itself, but is important in getting 
fledglings to survive through the flying learning process. An implausible 
consequence of OA is that such behavior would serve no function.10 In 
general, Organizational Accounts fail to attribute functions to  any  trait 
whose contribution is realized in individuals other than the bearer of the 
trait. 
3.1 The Reply
The original proponents of OA are alive to this difficulty, and have offered 
a solution in their  Saborido et  al.  (2011). Since, as we have seen, the 
core problem is that there does not appear to be any organization O such 
that  sperm contributes  to  the  maintenance of  O and O produces and 
maintains the sperm in question, the most obvious fix consists in finding 
an organization that could play this role: 
… the organization of the ’encompassing system’ composed by a 
reproducer and a produced system itself fits the characterization of 
a self-maintaining organization. The process of reproduction, in this 
sense, simply constitutes one of the functions through which the 
organization succeeds in maintaining itself beyond the lifespan of 
individual organisms. Since the encompassing system composed by 
the  producer  and  reproduced  organism  possesses  a  (temporally 
wider) self-maintaining organization, reproductive traits are subject 
to  organizational  closure,  and  their  functions  are  correctly 
grounded in the organizational account. (Saborido et  al.,  2011, p. 
600)
In other words, the idea is that there is, after all, an organization that 
underpins  the  attribution  of  function  to  cross-generational  traits:  the 
“encompassing system” which includes (at least) the system that carries 
the  trait  and  its  offspring  in  the  following  generation.  To  a  first 
approximation,  then,  an  encompassing  system  includes  a  set  of 
organisms of different generations of a single lineage.11 
10 Saborido et al. (2011) do not consider this kind of social traits in their discussion. 
11 This appears to be Saborido and colleagues' own gloss on encompassing 
systems:“The crucial point is that the organization of the system constituted by the 
conjunction of the reproducing and reproduced organisms (in this specific case, a 
minimal lineage with two elements) has exactly the same status, in terms of self- 
maintenance, as that of the individual organisms.” (Saborido et al. 2011, p. 600). It 
should be said that identifying an encompassing system with a lineage does not 
necessarily entail that  one is interpreting the lineage as a set of 'successive systems', 
Sperm, for instance, contributes to the maintenance of the encompassing 
system that includes a set of organisms of different generations in the 
lineage, including the one that actually carries  the sperm, and at the 
same  time  this  encompassing  system  produces  and  maintains  the 
sperm12.  By  appealing  to  systems  over  and  above  the  individual 
organisms, OA can provide an elegant reply to the objection from the 
existence of functional cross-generational traits. 
An important feature of this proposal is that it avoids distinguishing two 
different kinds of functions, ones attributed to cross-generational traits 
and the  other to  the  rest.  Similar proposals  within  the  organizational 
framework, like  Delancey  (2006)’s ’splitting account’, fail to meet this 
desideratum. Saborido and colleagues’ encompassing systems are self-
maintaining systems in the very same sense that organisms are, since 
both exert a causal influence on the maintenance of (at  least part of) 
their own conditions of existence. As a result, a more unified and simple 
account  emerges,  and  this  is  a  clear  advantage  over  rival  proposals 
within the same paradigm. 
Unfortunately, under closer scrutiny this solution is less satisfactory that 
it seems at first sight. As we will be suggesting presently, once the OA is 
supplemented  with  encompassing  systems,  it  emerges  as  yet  another 
etiological  theory  of  functions  –  and  one  that  does  not  provide  any 
substantial  advantage  over  other  prominent  solutions  in  this  well-
established paradigm. The remainder of this paper argues for this claim. 
4  Organizational  Accounts  and  Cross-Generational 
Functions
Saborido  and  colleagues’  solution  to  the  cross-generational  problem 
reveals that, in fact, OA is not an alternative to, but a particular version 
of,  the  etiological  family  of  theories  of  function.  To see this,  consider 
which is the fact that grounds a function attribution to semen according 
to OA (see figure 1 ).
In the figure, the token of semen marked in lighter grey comes from a 
certain contemporary donkey. According to the proposal we are currently 
investigating, this semen has a biological function in virtue of the fact 
that it (more on the reference of this pronoun below) has contributed to 
the  maintenance  of  the  organization of  the  encompassing  system 
constituted by the lineage of donkeys whence it belongs. Presumably the 
as opposed to an extended self-maintaining system, even if the second interpretation 
leads to its own problems, as we discuss in the sequel. We would like to thank an 
anonymous reviewer for prompting us to clarify this point.
12 In the definition provided in Mossio et al. (2009), a self-maintaning system also 
requires organizational differentiation , i.e. that 'the system itself generates distinct 
structures contributing in a different way to self-maintenance (Mossio et al., 2009, p. 
826). However, it is debatable whether encompassing systems also satisfy this 
requirement . Take a lineage of birds: what are its functionally differentiated parts? 
Individual birds, maybe? In any event we will not press this issue any further.
relevant  “organization”  here  is  the  lineage  itself,  that  is,  the  set  of 
donkeys as organized in relations of parenthood; and semen contributes 
to the maintenance of this organization by ensuring the reproduction of 
further (semen-producing) donkeys. 
Of course, for semen to have a function, it cannot be that it contributes to 
the maintenance of the encompassing system only once. As Saborido and 
colleagues  rightly  point  out  (in  the  clause  C2  of  their  definition  of 
function,  quoted  above)  the  trait  in  question  must  be  produced  and 
maintained by the very system the existence of which the trait helps to 
maintain. Thus, to have a function, a trait should be maintained by the 
system partially  in  virtue  of  its  past  contributions.  As  Saborido et  al. 
(2011, p. 598) suggest: 
In  our  account,  functional  traits  are  those  traits  that,  by  being 
subject to organizational closure, contribute to the maintenance of 
an organization, which in turn exerts some causal influence on the 
production and maintenance of the traits.
For this reason, they admit that this proposal entails that some time is 
Figure 1: An Encompassing System
required  for  a  cross-generational  trait  to  acquire  its  function 
(«[A]scribing functions to traits or parts requires the consideration of a 
system  that  realizes  self-maintenance  during  a  period  of  time  long 
enough for organizational closure to be observed.» Saborido et al. 2011, 
p. 598). In the application of this idea to encompassing systems, this can 
only  mean  that  the  semen  in  question  must  have  contributed  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  donkey  lineage  also  in  earlier  generations:  in  no 
other way the contribution of  semen to the encompassing system can 
happen for “a period of time long enough for organizational closure to be 
observed”. In summary, the fact that grounds a function attribution to 
donkey semen according to OA is something like: 
Function  Grounding  OA: 
C1)  Donkey semen has contributed to the maintenance of  the  
organization of a donkey lineage (by aiding donkey reproduction  
across generations), 
C2)  Semen is maintained and produced by this organization (say, 
its way of being a lineage, in which some individuals are parents or  
offspring of others13.)
That  is,  the  fact  that  warrants  our  attribution of  function to  a  cross-
generational trait such as semen is that semen has contributed to donkey 
reproduction in the past (C1) and this, in turn, explains that semen exists 
(C2). This is exactly the kind of function-endowing fact that etiological 
theories of biological function postulate. Witness The Etiology of Wings, 
as modified for the donkey-semen case:
The Etiology of Semen: The actual existence of this donkey’s  
semen is explained by semen having helped the donkey’s ancestors  
to reproduce in the (comparatively recent) past.
The upshot is that the appeal to encompassing systems turns OA into an 
etiological theory of function. 
5  Similarities  and  Differences  Between  OA  and  Other 
Etiological Accounts
5.1 The Epiphenomenality Problem
A corollary from the conclusion of the last section is that OA seems to fall 
prey  to  the  epiphenomenality  problem.  As  we  have  seen,  cross-
generational  traits  have  function  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  previous 
instances of the trait in the same encompassing system have contributed 
to the maintenance of the system in question. This is compatible with the 
trait-instance to which we are currently interested in attributing function 
13 Again, the claim about organizational differentiation is disputable, but we will simply 
grant it for the sake of the argument.
not having contributed to the maintenance of the encompassing system 
in the relevant manner. In other words; whether a particular instance of 
semen contributes  to  the  maintenance of  the  encompassing system is 
irrelevant for attributing a function to it.
It  is  not  an  accident  that,  according  to  OA,  an  instance  of  a  cross-
generational  trait  does not  have to  contribute in  order to be deemed 
functional:  instances  of  a  cross-generational  trait  in  an encompassing 
system play  the  same role  that  time-slices  of  a  trait  instance  play  in 
individual organisms (see 5.4. below), and OA, very sensibly,  does not 
claim that  every time slice  of  a  trait  instance must  contribute  to  the 
maintenance of the organism that hosts it for the trait to be functional. 
Otherwise, the theory would be unable to account for malfunction, since 
it would be impossible for a trait to have a function and fail to contribute 
to a  system (this point is discussed in more detail  in [author1]).  It is 
unclear what would be a principled reason to apply a different policy in 
the cross-generational case.
5.2 The Size of the Encompassing System. 
While most popular etiological theories of function (as, say, Millikan’s or 
Neander’s versions) appeal to the notion of selection for in order to pick 
out the right set of past instances of a natural trait that are relevant for 
the determination of function, OA appeals to an encompassing system. It 
might be defended that the size of the encompassing system – that is, the 
number of generations necessary to ensure that conditions C1 and C2 in 
the definition above are met – is smaller than the number of ancestors 
needed to selection for a trait. This, in its turn, would make OA more 
flexible in its function attributions, and this is perhaps desirable. It is 
unclear, though, to what extent there is a difference in size here: all the 
etiological theory demands for a trait T to have the function of doing F is 
for the fact that Ts do F to have had a non-negligible contribution to the 
actual existence of Ts. What counts as non-negligible is a vague matter, 
though, and it is unclear that it amounts to a much bigger number of 
generation than the notion of encompassing system needs (see Millikan, 
1993, p. 46-7). That is, while we do not claim that OA is worse off in this  
respect than other selected-effects theories, we do claim that it offers no 
advantage. Neither theory appeals to the whole lineage, and both require 
a significant amount  of  time in order  to  attribute  functions.  There  is, 
then,  no  reason  here  to  choose  it  against  other,  well-established 
contenders.
5.3. What Counts as a Functional Trait?
One important difference between standard etiological accounts and OA 
has  to  do with  the  individuation of  functional  traits.  Recall,  from the 
definition Organizational Function, that according to OA a particular trait 
T has a function only if  (C1) T contributes to the maintenance of the 
organization and (C2) the organization maintains T in its turn. The main 
idea behind these conditions is that there must be a causal loop between 
the particular trait we are attributing a function to and the organization 
that contains and maintains T. Crucially, this loop must take place at the 
level  of  tokens.  Organizational  Accounts  want  to  resist  ascribing 
functions to particular traits in virtue of their belonging to certain types, 
since they are precisely  motivated by the intuition that  it  is  the  very 
activity of the token what determines its function.
Now, a first remark is that no single cross-generational token trait T can 
satisfy conditions C1 and C2. Recall that function attributions require a 
causal  loop  between  a  trait  and  the  conditions  that  explain  its  own 
production and maintenance (see the passage in Saborido et al., 2011, p. 
598 quoted above). The problem, however, is that if we focus on a cross-
generational trait token, this causal loop is missing: the contribution of 
the  trait  does  not  help  to  explain  its  own  maintenance,  but  the 
maintenance  of  other  token  traits  of  the  same  type.  Suppose,  for 
instance, that we are trying to provide a function attribution to a certain 
contemporary  volume  of  donkey  semen  –  say,  the  seminal  discharge 
marked  in  lighter  gray  in  figure  1.  While  this  volume of  semen  may 
indeed contribute to the maintenance of the donkey lineage whence it 
belongs  (thus  meeting  condition  C1),  it  is  not  “maintained”  by  the 
encompassing system  because of its own contribution.  Consequently, C1 
and C2  cannot be satisfied by a single cross-generational token trait. 
Likewise, the same argument can be applied to other cross-generational 
traits. The conclusion is that few, if any, cross-generational trait tokens 
(individual seminal discharges, flight-teaching bird behaviors, etc.) have 
function. 
Since the supporter of the Organizational Theory holds that C1 and C2 
specify the conditions for ascribing a function to semen and, at the same 
time, maintains that function attribution depends on the activity of the 
token (rather than on its belonging to a certain type), the only option 
available in order to avoid this conclusion is to claim that the different 
instances  of  semen  of  many  individual  donkeys  constitute  the  same 
token. That is, the organizational theorist must hold that the semen of a 
significant  set  of  donkeys  that  belong  to  different  generations  are 
numerically the same semen.
This surprising conclusion has an easy explanation: the maintenance of 
no  cross-generational  trait  is  explained  (even  if  partly)  by  its  own 
contribution to the encompassing system, since by definition traits with 
cross-generational functions have effects only on later generations, and 
are produced only because of the effects of previous generations. So no 
particular trait will be able to satisfy conditions C1 and C2 above. If one 
wants to stick at the idea that function attribution depends on the activity 
of tokens,14 the only way OA can provide functions to particular traits is 
14  If the supporter of the Organizational Account makes a distinction between types 
and tokens and claims that tokens have functions in virtue of belonging to certain 
types, then (1) Organizational Theories would indeed adopt a sort of splitting 
account, according to which the way cross-generational traits acquire functions 
differs from the way standard traits acquire them (2) the epiphenomenality problem 
would even be more pressing.
by assuming that the trait that satisfies C1 and C2 is numerically the 
same trait;  the semen discharged by different generations numerically 
the  same  sperm.  In  other  words,  the  functional  trait  token  is  the 
scattered individual  constituted by  all  seminal  discharges  in  a certain 
donkey lineage. Similarly, no individual eggshell has function, only the 
mereological sum of all eggshells in a certain lineage, etc.15 This way of 
individuating traits  is  extremely counterintuitive – outlandish,  rather.16 
But  it,  or  something  like  it,  is  unavoidable  if  one  insists  in  linking 
functional  attributions  with  causal  loops  in  traits  whose  causal 
contribution is exclusively forward-looking.17
5.4 Beyond Cross-Generational Traits
We have argued that the appeal to encompassing systems as a means to 
solve the cross-generational problem for OA turns this account into an 
etiological theory of function. In fact, there are reasons to think that OA 
is an etiological theory well beyond its application to cross-generational 
traits:  As  we  have  seen,  cross-generational  traits  are  endowed  with 
function by their role in the maintenance of an encompassing system, i.e., 
the lineage of individuals that produce said traits. We may now note that 
those traits whose function, OA wants to claim, depends on their role in 
the maintenance of a single individual – e.g., hearts, kidneys, brains, etc. 
– also participate in the maintenance of the same lineage-encompassing-
system:  it  is  obvious  that  donkey  hearts  have  contributed  to  the 
maintenance of the donkey lineage: without hearts, the individuals which 
form part of the lineage would not have existed. It is equally obvious that 
the  donkey  lineage  has  maintained  and  produced  hearts:  without 
offspring donkeys there would have been no new hearts, just as there 
would have been no new semen. 
This being so, what is the principled reason to claim that the function of 
semen is fixed by the encompassing system, but the function of hearts is 
fixed by the individuals who compose the encompassing system? In the 
absence  of  such  reasons,  and  there  doesn’t  seem  to  be  any, 
considerations of symmetry compel OA to make the function of hearts 
(kidneys,  brains,  etc.)  dependent  on  their  contribution  to  the 
maintenance of the lineage.18 This is, in effect, a version of the etiological 
15  Also, notice the following asymmetry: only traits with cross-generational functions 
have to be individuated cross-generationally. So, while my heart is different from my 
father’s heart, my sperm is the same as my father’s sperm. This is surely implausible.
16 And, for behavioral traits such as the one in in geese discussed above, dubiously 
coherent. 
17 It is worth stressing that the individuation problem is rooted in the etiological aspect 
of OA. OA is committed to this counterintuitive individuation of traits because one of 
the conditions for function attribution is forward-looking (C1) while another one is 
backward-looking (C2).
18  A possible reply by the OA-proponent would be to claim that the function of 
individual hearts is fixed by its role in the maintenance of individuals, but that the 
function of the mereological sum of all hearts in a lineage is fixed by its role in the 
maintenance of the encompassing system. At first glance, this does not look like a 
comfortable resting point for the organizational account, although it is perhaps worth 
theory of the function of hearts.19 
Finally, note that if OA offers a version of the etiological theory for all 
traits,  the epiphenomenality problem would not be restricted to cross-
generational traits, but would affect all traits. As a result, one of the main 
motivations for preferring OA to etiological theories would disappear.
6 Conclusions
We have argued that the Organizational Account defended by Mossio and 
colleagues is, at bottom, a deployment of the distinctly historical kind of 
etiological insight that informs many of the best known extant accounts 
of function. The entry point to this conclusion has been the treatment of 
cross-generational traits by OA: the notion of encompassing system used 
to accommodate these obviously functional traits is nothing more than a 
terminological variant on the notion of lineage exploited by mainstream 
selected-effects  theories.  Furthermore,  OA  can  deal  with  cross-
generational  traits  only  by  proposing  the  following,  highly  contrived 
locus  of  functional  attribution:  the  scattered individual  formed by  the 
mereological  sum of,  e.g.,  all  instances  of  semen,  or  all  instances  of 
certain  teaching  behaviors.  This  makes  OA less  appealing  than  other 
etiological alternatives. 
We have also argued that the etiological leanings of OA do not just show 
in its treatment of cross-generational cases:  considerations of symmetry 
militate  in  favor  of  giving an etiological  unpacking  of  the  function of 
hearts and kidneys – traits, that is, which OA would want to treat in strict 
intra-individual terms.  OA, in a very substantial range of cases, is an 
etiological  theory  of  function  –  and,  for  example,  it  falls  prey  to  the 
epiphenomenalism problem just as much as standard etiological theories 
do.
If the arguments in this paper are sound, it has yet to be shown that the 
Organizational  Account  provides  any  substantive  advantage  over 
standard etiological theories of function.
Acknowledgements
Financial  support  for  this  work  was  provided  by  the  DGI,  Spanish 
Government,  research  project  FFI2011-26853  and  Consolider-Ingenio 
project CSD2009-00056; the Generalitat de Catalunya, under grant 2014-
SGR-81;  a  Postdoctoral  Fellowship  at  the  Instituto  de  Investigaciones 
Filosoficas (UNAM) and a Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Munich Center 
exploring.
19  Note that the OA cannot be considered a 'forward-looking' theory of functions (such 
as Bigelow and Pargatter, 1987) because, if we are right, according to the OA the 
function of a trait depends on the fact that this trait contributed to the maintenance 
of the lineage in the recent past. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for 
making this proposal.
for  Mathematical  Philosophy  at  the  Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München. 
References
Allen, C.: 2009, Teleological Notions in Biology, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, winter 2009 edn.
Avital, E. and E. Yablonka: 2000, Animal Traditions: Behavioural 
Inheritance in Evolution. Cambridge University Press. 
Ayala, F.  J.: 1970, ‘Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology’. 
Philosophy of Science 37(1), 1–15. 
Bigelow, J. and R. Pargetter: 1987, ‘Functions’. Journal of Philosophy 
84(4), 181–196. 
Boorse, C.: 1976, ‘Wright on Functions’. Philosophical Review 85(1), 70–
86. 
Buller, D.: 1998. 'Etiological theories of function: A geographical survey'. 
Biology and Philosophy 13(4), 505-527.
Christensen, W. D. and Bickhard, M. H.: 2002, 'The Process Dynamics of 
Normative Function', The Monist 12(6), 795-823.
Cummins, R.: 1975, ‘Functional Analysis’. Journal of Philosophy 72, 741–
765. 
Davies, P. S.: 2001, Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of 
Functions. The MIT Press. 
Delancey, C.  S.: 2006, ‘Ontology and Teleofunctions: A Defense and 
Revision of the Systematic Account of Teleological Explanation’. 
Synthese 150(1). 
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 1994, ‘A modern history theory of functions’. Noûs 
28(3), 344–362. 
Millikan, R.  G.: 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological 
Categories. MIT Press. 
Millikan, R.  G.: 1989, ‘In defense of Proper Functions’. Philosophy of 
Science, 56(June), 288–302. 
Millikan, R.  G.: 1993, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for 
Alice. MIT Press. 
Millikan, R.  G.: 2002, ‘Biofunctions: Two Paradigms’. In: Functions. 
Oxford University Press, pp. 113–143. 
Mossio, M., C. Saborido, and A. Moreno: 2009, ‘An Organizational 
Account of Biological Functions’. British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 60(4), 813–841. 
Neander, K.: 1991, ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual 
Analyst's Defense’. Philosophy of Science 58(2), 168–184.
Price, C.: 1998, ‘Determinate Functions’. Noûs 32(1), 54–75.
 Saborido, C., M. Mossio, and A. Moreno: 2011, ‘Biological Organization 
and Cross-Generation Functions’ British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 62, 583-606
Wilson, R. A. and Craver, C. F.: 2006, ‘Realization: Metaphysical and 
Scientific Perspectives’, in D. M. Gabbay, J. Woods and P. Thagard (eds.), 
Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, North Holland, pp. 81-
104.
Wright, L.: 1973, ‘Functions’. Philosophical Review 82(2), 139–168. 
